Collusion-proof and fair auctions

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dc.contributor.authorHagen, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-20T08:57:13Z
dc.date.issued2019-12
dc.description.abstractIn the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).
dc.description.departmentEconomía
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108682
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35
dc.issue.number108682
dc.journal.titleEconomics Letters
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.keywordmechanism design
dc.subject.keywordsocial choice theory
dc.subject.keywordauctions
dc.subject.keywordgroup strategyproofness
dc.subject.keywordsymmetry
dc.titleCollusion-proof and fair auctions
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionAM
dc.volume.number185

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